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THE MEANING OF THE MARKET MYTH
Benjamin Means*
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pp. xi, 390. $16.99
I. SHOCKING ALAN GREENSPAN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 R
II. MARKET MYTHOLOGIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 R
III. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 R
On April 13, 2011, a bipartisan U.S. Senate subcommittee issued its
final report, concluding that the financial crisis of 2008 “was not a natural
disaster, but the result of high risk, complex financial products; undis-
closed conflicts of interest; and the failure of regulators, the credit rating
agencies, and the market itself to rein in the excesses of Wall Street.”1 The
subcommittee was hardly staking out new ground. An emerging consensus
holds that self-interested bankers, mortgage brokers, and other insiders
took advantage of weak or broken regulations to profit at the expense of
ordinary investors, homeowners, and the larger society.2  Rather than op-
erating as a constraint, the market soared to irrational levels, buoyed by a
widely shared assumption that real estate prices would continue to rise.
The financial crisis of 2008 is only the latest example of market irra-
tionality.3 In The Myth of the Rational Market, Justin Fox uses the finan-
cial crisis as the backdrop for a broader story about how markets work.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. I thank
Matt Bodie for motivating this project by inviting me to join a roundtable discussion of the
book on Prawfsblawg. This review builds upon my previous blog comments and is informed
by the views of my fellow participants: Matt Bodie, Lynn Stout, and the author, Justin Fox. I
also thank Brandon Smith for his research assistance.
1. COMM. ON HOMELAND SECURITY & GOV’T AFFAIRS, WALL STREET AND THE FI-
NANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/
cms/fc7d55c8-661a-11e0-9d40-00144feab49a.pdf [hereinafter Levin-Coburn Report on the Fi-
nancial Crisis] (last visited Feb. 1, 2012).
2. See, e.g., JOHN CASSIDY, HOW MARKETS FAIL: THE LOGIC OF ECONOMIC CALAMI-
TIES (2009); MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010);
RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE DESCENT
INTO DEPRESSION (2009); Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall Street:
A Gatekeeper’s Guide to the Psychology, Culture, and Ethics of Financial Risk Taking, 96
CORNELL L. REV. 1209 (2011); Michael E. Murphy, Assuring Responsible Risk Management
in Banking: The Corporate Governance Dimension, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 121, 122 (2011);
Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 1073 (2009).
3. See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 34 (6th ed.
1996) (“Greed run amok has been an essential feature of every spectacular boom in history.
In their frenzy for money, market participants throw over firm foundations of value for the
dubious but thrilling assumption that they too can make a killing . . . . Such thinking can, and
has, enveloped entire nations.”).
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Although he includes a preamble and an epilogue focused on recent
events (pp. xi-xvi, 309-21), Fox leaves to others most of the reporting on
too-big-to-fail financial institutions, mortgage-backed securities, and the
derivatives trading activities that one well-known investor described
presciently as “time bombs, both for the parties that deal in them and the
economic system.”4 Rather than investigating the immediate causes of the
crisis, Fox aims to explain why anyone could have believed that markets
are fundamentally rational and therefore reliably self-policing. He de-
scribes how the rational-market idea developed, how it was championed,
and how its defenders have either addressed or ignored a variety of criti-
cisms and contradictory evidence.
Although the book’s title implies that the financial crisis of 2008 repre-
sented a final dismantling of faith in rational markets, the book is more
even-handed than its title might suggest. In the aftermath of disastrously
leveraged and complex financial products that seem to have been pre-
mised on the notion that real estate prices can only go up, few would claim
that markets always know best.5 However, as Fox also observes, financial
markets by and large do an exceedingly good job of reflecting information
relevant to the value of companies whose stocks are publicly traded (p.
102). The book provides an engaging history of financial economics and an
unbiased guide to some of the most important scholarly articles concern-
ing market rationality.
This Book Review contends that the perfectly rational market may be
a myth, not just in the sense of a false or over-simplified account of reality,
but also in the deeper, anthropological sense of cultural explanation. Part I
describes how rational-market theories were developed by financial econ-
omists and applied to Wall Street, sometimes without adequate apprecia-
tion for the difference between simplified economic models and real-world
behavior.6 Part II contends that if the rational-market theory has met with
acceptance that outstrips its empirical support, the favorable reception
may be explained in part by the theory’s congruence with broader norma-
tive views about laissez faire social ordering.7
4. Warren E. Buffet, Chairman of the Board, Berkshire Hathaway, Annual Letter to
Shareholders 13 (2002), available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2002pdf.pdf
(last visited Jan. 26, 2012).
5. Even if market prices were irrational, it may be the case that certain individual
market participants acted rationally by going along with what they recognized to be an unsus-
tainable bubble. See CASSIDY, supra note 2, at 182 (“In the presence of naı̈ve investors, some R
of whom may react to rising prices by buying more stocks, selling overpriced stocks is risky.
Instead of trying to counteract the activities of noise traders, and pushing prices back toward
fundamental levels, it may well pay to trade along side them.”).
6. Summarizing a summary of the history of financial economics risks diminishing
returns, to borrow a term from the discipline. For a proper introduction, interested readers
should consult the book.
7. In other words, the financial markets can be studied from a cultural perspective.
See, e.g., T.C. Bestor, Markets: Anthropological Aspects, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 9227, 9227 (2001) (“Anthropological studies of
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I. SHOCKING ALAN GREENSPAN
The Myth of the Rational Market opens with a vignette that highlights
the book’s central theme: former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Green-
span’s remarkable admission that he was wrong to believe that markets
are reliably self-correcting and therefore need little government regulation
or oversight. In testimony before the House Committee on Government
Oversight and Reform, Greenspan stated that when the markets crashed,
he was “‘shocked’” and that the “‘whole intellectual edifice collapsed’”
(p. xii). In Fox’s pithy summary, Greenspan conceded “[t]hat he had mis-
understood how the world works” (p. xi).
Fox then traces the idea of a rational, self-correcting market—Green-
span’s “intellectual edifice”—back to Irving Fisher, an economist in the
early 1900s who introduced probability theory and economic analysis to
the study of stock price movements (p. 3). Fisher’s contributions to eco-
nomics aside, his life story is another cautionary tale concerning the dan-
gers of too much faith in market rationality. As Fox recounts, Fisher is best
known as a stock character in histories of the 1929 market crash, in which
he serves “as a sort of idiot Greek chorus” who “pop[s] up every few pages
to assert that stock prices ha[ve] reached a ‘permanently high plateau’” (p.
5). When the market crashed, Fisher lost his own fortune (p. 5).
Fox diagnoses in Fisher a susceptibility that extends, by implication, to
Alan Greenspan and others whose laxity contributed to the recent finan-
cial crisis:
Irving Fisher had succumbed to the myth of the rational market. It is a
myth of great power—one that, much of the time, explains reality pretty well.
But it is nonetheless a myth, an oversimplification that, when taken too liter-
ally, can lead to all sorts of trouble. Fisher was just the first in a line of distin-
guished scholars who saw reason and scientific order in the market and made
fools of themselves on the basis of this conviction. Most of the others came
along much later, though. Irving Fisher was ahead of his time (p. 6).
So how did the theory of market rationality develop and gain adher-
ents? Why might we believe that market prices reflect the value of traded
securities? First, we have to recognize that market prices are important
because they contain information. Markets aggregate the signals each indi-
vidual investor sends by revealing a willingness to buy or sell securities at a
particular price, and the resulting changes in the price of publicly traded
securities influence the production and allocation of goods and services in
society. Fox cites Friedrich Hayek’s important article, The Use of Knowl-
edge in Society, for this proposition and for its corollary: no centralized
government planner has access to all the relevant, dispersed data, and only
the market can capture it (p. 91).8 Thus, “[a]ny attempt to regulate prices
markets analyze them as nodes of complex social processes and generators of cultural activity
as well as realms for economic exchange.”).
8. This insight builds on Adam Smith’s metaphor—markets can function as an “invis-
ible hand” that allocates societal goods to those who value them most, even though the mar-
ket participants intend only to advance their own self-interest.
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or business activity was doomed to thwart the movement of knowledge
needed to make the economy run smoothly” (p. 92). Hayek’s insight sup-
ports both a faith in market ordering and a suspicion of government
interventionism.9
If publicly traded securities capture information, the next question is
whether they do so efficiently: “[a] security’s price can be seen as being
established in an efficient market if, with respect to specific information,
the price that exists for the security is the same as the price it would have if
everyone had the same information.”10 One possible test of market effi-
ciency is whether it is possible to make money by buying or selling securi-
ties based on (1) “technical” analysis of patterns in past stock price
movements,11 or (2) “fundamental” analysis of any difference between a
security’s expected future earnings (discounted to present value, adjusted
for risk) and its current market price.12 The more efficient the market is,
the less likely that there will be information lying around unused that can
be exploited profitably by an individual trader.13
According to the efficient capital markets hypothesis—which takes the
idea of a rational market to its logical conclusion—market trading ap-
proaches perfection in its ability to impound information in stock prices
(p. 101). Markets never misunderstand or overlook information, and, as a
consequence, there are no meaningful profits available for savvy investors
(p. 103). Rather, the market price is always the correct price. The efficient
capital markets hypothesis comes in three basic flavors: weak, semi-strong,
and strong (p. 101).
The market is considered efficient in the weak sense if “security prices
reflect all the information embodied in the past prices of that security.”14
If so, no one can reliably make money by analyzing where the market has
been in order to predict where it is going.15 The information has already
9. See CASSIDY, supra note 2, at 43 (“The history of the Soviet bloc demonstrated R
what happens when governments replace market price signals with central planning and
prices that are administratively determined.”).
10. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 104
(6th ed. 2009) (citing H. Beaver, Market Efficiency, 56 ACCT. REV. 23 (1981)).
11. This is sometimes also referred to as chart reading. See MALKIEL, supra note 3, at R
117 (“Technical analysis is essentially the making and interpreting of stock charts.”).
12. Id. (“Fundamentalists believe that eventually the market will reflect accurately the
security’s real worth.”).
13. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency,
70 VA. L. REV. 549, 555 (1984) (contending that “[t]he common definition of market effi-
ciency” amounts to an “empirical claim that ‘available information’ does not support profita-
ble trading strategies or arbitrage opportunities”). The assumption that no information will
go unused provides the punch line for the joke about an economist out walking who disdains
to pick up a $20 bill lying in the street: “If it were real, someone would have picked it up
already.”
14. COX ET AL., supra note 10, at 104. R
15. MALKIEL, supra note 3, at 144 (arguing that even if there is not quite “complete R
independence of present price movements from those in the past . . . any systematic relation-
ships that exist are so small that they are not useful for an investor”).
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been priced in, and the market’s path is then said to resemble a “random
walk.”16 Thus, there are no patterns that a trader can find to anticipate
with more than random accuracy whether the market as a whole, or any
individual traded stock, will continue to move in one direction or another.
Markets, of course, will “go up on good news and down on bad news,” but
these changes are random in the sense that “future changes in price are
independent of past changes.”17
The semi-strong version of the market-efficiency hypothesis holds that
market pricing incorporates all current public information relevant to the
value of a given security. According to this hypothesis, even fundamental
analysis of a company’s likely future earnings cannot help an investor beat
the market because a security’s market value already reflects all existing
information. As new information becomes available, it is incorporated into
the stock price too quickly to be useful in making a profit.18 Finally, the
strong version of the market efficiency hypothesis holds, somewhat im-
plausibly, that “security prices reflect all information, whether that infor-
mation is publicly available or not.”19
The efficient capital market hypothesis, at least in its weak and semi-
strong variants, is supported by both logic and evidence.20 The logic is that
of arbitrage: if there really were systematic patterns in stock price move-
ments or discrepancies between price and fundamental value, savvy trad-
ers would have exploited the gap and made outsized profits until the
discrepancy was traded away.21 As long as the market has access to the
relevant information,22 there is no reason to believe that markets will sys-
tematically misprice that information in a way by which an individual
trader can profit.23 As Fox reports, empirical investigation has confirmed
16. Id. at 24 (“A random walk is one in which future steps or directions cannot be
predicted on the basis of past actions.”).
17. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 113 (2002).
18. Thus, there are no “bargain” stocks or asset classes.
19. COX ET AL., supra note 10, at 105. In fact, “[t]here is no significant empirical evi- R
dence supporting the view that markets are efficient in the strong form.” Id.
20. See Michael C. Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6
J. FIN. ECON. 95, 95 (1978) (stating that “there is no other proposition in economics which
has more solid empirical evidence supporting it than the Efficient Markets Hypothesis”).
21. See CASSIDY, supra note 2, at 86 (“If markets rise above the levels justified by R
fundamental, well-informed speculators step in and sell until prices return to their correct
levels. If prices fall below their true values, speculators step in and buy. It is easy to see how a
free market economist could fall in love with this logic . . . .”).
22. Note that this does not require the implausible assumption that all investors have
access to the information. Instead, the argument is that intelligent and well-informed inves-
tors will drive prices toward their true value, because uninformed investors who trade on
“noise” will do so randomly and will not bias the market price away from its true value.
23. There are some investors, notably including Warren Buffet, who do seem to be
able to beat the market on a regular basis, but most individual investors and investment
managers who do well in a particular period soon regress back to the mean. This is why
selling low performing mutual funds is often a really bad idea: it reverses the rule that one
should buy low and sell high and it relies on the (usually) false belief that if a particular fund
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“beyond any reasonable doubt that yes, financial markets [do] a spectacu-
lar job of reflecting and transmitting new information—even well-hidden
new information—by means of prices” (p. 102).24
The impact of rational-market theory in general, and the efficient capi-
tal markets hypothesis in particular, would be hard to overstate.25 Index
funds and other investment vehicles that offer low-cost baskets of securi-
ties have been created to satisfy investor demand, consistent with the shib-
boleth that favors a buy-and-hold strategy with broad market exposure at
the lowest possible cost.26 All this follows from the conclusion that inves-
tors cannot reliably beat the market, and that it makes no sense for them
to pay a percentage of their returns so that a market professional can try
to beat it on their behalf.27 In addition to its standing as “one of the most
basic principles of modern corporate finance theory,” the efficient capital
markets hypothesis’s “influence on corporate law has been dramatic.”28
Professor Stephen Bainbridge observes, for instance, that it “has had an
enormous impact on the SEC’s disclosure rules and the elements of securi-
ties fraud” and “also has been a crucial part of the debate over the desira-
bility of insider trading prohibitions.”29
Notwithstanding the influence of the efficient capital markets hypothe-
sis, mostly right is not the same thing as always right: the hypothesis de-
does well, its managers must be better than the managers of the low-performing fund. See,
e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 17, at 114 (“The empirical evidence suggests that the vast ma- R
jority of mutual funds that outperform the market in a given year falter in future years.”).
24. A remaining, contested question is whether the prices set by the market, however
efficiently, correspond to the fundamental value of the security: “Those who take exception
to the usefulness of the efficient market hypothesis do so principally because the evidence is
weak that markets are fundamentally efficient, meaning they do not yield prices that reflect
the intrinsic value of the security.” COX ET AL., supra note 10, at 107. On the other hand, it is R
often “meaningless to talk about the ‘intrinsic value’ of corporate stock. As a marketable
commodity, a share of stock has no value other than what someone else is willing to pay for
it.” BAINBRIDGE, supra note 17, at 114.
25. Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New
Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 636 (2003) (stating that “efficient markets theory had, by the
1970s, captured the imagination of a generation of economists and finance theorists”).
26. See CASSIDY, supra note 2, at 90. R
27. See, e.g., MALKIEL, supra note 3, at 140 (“The central proposition of charting is R
absolutely false, and investors who follow its precepts will accomplish nothing but increasing
substantially the brokerage charges they pay.”).
28. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 17, at 112–13.   The theory also supported arguments that R
a market for control of corporations could force managers to serve shareholder interests
more effectively than top-down regulation:   “How could executives be made to pay attention
to the verdict of the stock market? If they were worried that somebody might buy their
company and throw them on the street, that might be a motivator” (p. 164-65).   For the
classic version of the argument, see Henry Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate
Control, 73 J. POLITICAL ECON. 110 (1965).
29. Id. at 113; see also Stout, supra note 25, at 636 (“By the mid-1980s, ‘market effi-
ciency’ had become a mantra not only of finance economists, but also of securities scholars,
regulators, and even judges and practicing lawyers.” (citing Gilson & Kraakman, supra note
13, at 549–50)). R
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scribes a mechanism whereby information affects price, but it ignores the
fact that “price movements also sometimes reflect[ ] false information, in-
correct interpretation, and plain old mood swings” (p. 102).30 An underly-
ing, economic assumption about human behavior—that investors are
unfailingly rational actors—was extended from economics to finance,
where it became an assumption “that financial markets [a]re rational” (p.
107).31 Thus, “[b]y making a simplifying assumption about the real world,
finance professors were able to produce research that was enormously use-
ful” (p. 107). However, the nuance rubbed off, especially as the idea was
picked up by Wall Street and by academics in other disciplines, including
law.32 In short, for Fox, the idea of a rational market is a “myth,” not
because it is wrong, but because it is a “simplification” of reality.33
II. MARKET MYTHOLOGIES
  Myths, however, are more than simplifications; they provide narratives
that help us understand our world and orient ourselves within it. Tradition-
ally, a myth is said to be “a legendary story that invokes gods and heroes
and explains a cultural practice or phenomenon.”34 These explanations
30. For critiques of the efficient capital markets hypothesis, see, for example, Law-
rence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes:   The Linear Genealogy of
the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546 (1994); Donald C.
Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation:   Market Efficiency Revisited,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 851 (1992); Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient:   An
Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613
(1988).
31. Fox argues that “[l]ike physicists ignoring friction in building their models of the
world, economists became more and more comfortable with ignoring widely recognized reali-
ties of human behavior in order to build better models of it” JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE
RATIONAL MARKET: A HISTORY OF RISK, REWARD, AND DELUSION ON WALL STREET 28
(2011). For further discussion of the uses and limits of standard economic models, see for
instance, Benjamin Means, A Contractual Approach to Shareholder Oppression Law, 79
FORDHAM L. REV. 1161 (2010). To be clear, the efficient markets hypothesis allows for indi-
vidually irrational traders—“noise” traders to be polite about it—but rejects the notion that
irrational behavior could be systematic (e.g., that “noise” investors will buy more of a secur-
ity for no other reason than that its price has gone up), or that the volume of “noise” signals
could drown out more rational price signaling.
32. FOX, supra note 31, at 162 (“When such a theory is transferred intact to another
discipline, a lot of . . . baggage is inevitably lost.”). For similar analysis of the nuances lost in
discussion of the so-called Coase theorem, see Pierre Schlag, The Problem of Transaction
Costs, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1661 (1989) (arguing that legal academics have misunderstood
Ronald Coase’s work by taking his description of a world without transaction costs as a
model for analysis and policy prescription, when Coase’s actual point was the opposite—that
any satisfactory model must account for transaction costs).
33. For a useful summary of the many logical and empirical objections that have been
lodged against the hypothesis, see Stout, supra note 25.
34. THE NEW WEBSTER’S ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1997) (quoted in MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF
DEPENDENCY 11 (2004)).
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can “offer guidelines for actions”35 and help to justify the existing societal
order:
In his classic book Myth and Reality, Mircea Eliade argued that there are
many varieties of myth . . . . Like the myths described by Eliade, political
myths do not merely entertain; they promote practical purposes. They are
based on the story of a society’s beginnings, but they also explain the present
and provide a vision of the future.36
If politics depends for its legitimacy on certain shared cultural myths,
so too does an economic system of exchange.37 As cultural phenomena,
“[m]arketplaces embody a localized set of social institutions, social actors,
property rights, products, transactional relationships, trade practices, and
cultural meanings framed by a wide variety of factors including, but not
limited to, ‘purely economic’ or ‘market’ forces.”38 Theories about how
markets work must also explain the cultural and social context in which
those markets are embedded.39 Accordingly, and as a friendly addition to
Fox’s thesis, this Part contends that the “myth of the rational market” can
refer to the anthropological function as well as the economic logic of the
financial markets.
A. Bulls, Bears, and Animal Spirits
  Like other myths, theories of market behavior that purport to identify
purposeful patterns in market prices over time satisfy a human need to
find order: “[n]o matter what the laws of chance might tell us, we search
for patterns among random events wherever they might occur.”40 Once
displayed graphically on charts, market prices show upward and down-
ward slopes that appear, in hindsight to display regularities: “[i]n other
35. ADAM KUPER, CULTURE: THE ANTHROPOLOGISTS’ ACCOUNT 176 (1999).
36. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPEN-
DENCY 11 (2004) (citing HENRY TUDOR, POLITICAL MYTH 14–17 (1972)).
37. Nor are politics and economics radically separate spheres. See, e.g., EMILY
CHAMLEE-WRIGHT, THE CULTURAL AND POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RECOVERY: SOCIAL
LEARNING IN A POST-DISASTER ENVIRONMENT 15 (2010) (“Political economy . . . seeks to
reveal the fundamental connections between the economy and the political and institutional
environment.”).
38. Bestor, supra note 7, at 9227. R
39. See, e.g., NEIL FLIGSTEIN, THE ARCHITECTURE OF MARKETS: AN ECONOMIC SOCI-
OLOGY OF TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY CAPITALIST SOCIETIES 97 (2001) (“Markets are social
constructions that reflect the unique political-cultural construction of their firms and nations.
The creation of markets implies societal solutions to the problems of property rights, govern-
ance structures, conceptions of control, and rules of exchange.”). To identify a cultural belief
as a myth is not to reject its empirical validity; it could be the case that certain theories of
market ordering are sustained by their mythic resonance, and that those theories also happen
to be true. If so, the next question would be whether the myth provides the correct functional
explanation. For instance, an ancient Greek who believed that the sun was a god driven
across the sky each day by a team of horses would correctly anticipate the sun’s path each
day, though more elaborate astronomical calculations would not be possible on such a
foundation.
40. MALKIEL, supra note 3, at 149. R
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words, we want to see regular waves in economic data, and thus we do” (p.
41).
Technical analysts create and study charts to identify stock market
trends on the belief that “[a] stock that is rising tends to keep on rising,
whereas a stock at rest tends to remain at rest.”41 Notably missing is any
convincing explanation for why analysis of this kind produces reliable pre-
dictions of future market prices.42 According to Burton Malkiel, “many
chartists freely admit that they don’t know why charting should work—
history just has a habit of repeating itself.”43 The underlying mechanism,
to the extent that one can be identified, seems to be rooted in psychol-
ogy—an effort to anticipate what other investors are likely to do based on
the psychological characteristics of the market itself.44 The Wall Street
Bull and Bear are, from this perspective, mythical creatures that represent
the mood of the market, and by extension, the nation.
Notwithstanding its thin theoretical foundation, technical analysis
boasts an elaborate jargon to describe stock-price movements, including
“such terms as double bottoms, breakthrough, violating the lows, firmed
up, big play, ascending peaks, and buying climax.”45 Perhaps in order to
affirm its own status as a scientific discipline, technical analysis appears to
have “developed into extremely intricate productions of self-referential
complexity.”46 In its purest form, the method ignores everything but the
charts: “A true chartist doesn’t even care to know what business or indus-
try a company is in, as long as he can study its stock chart.”47 The tech-
nique separates itself entirely from the outside world and operates
according to its own internal logic.48
41. Id. at 118.
42. Beyond a certain point, no adequate mechanism can be posited. See, e.g., FOX,
supra note 31, at 71 (“‘Like the Indian folk doctors who discovered tranquilizers, the Wall
Street witch doctors, without benefit of the scientific method, have produced something with
their magic, even if they can’t tell you what it is or how it works.’”) (citation omitted).
43. MALKIEL, supra note 3, at 118. R
44. Id. at 123 (identifying a crowd-psychology argument behind technical analysis).
For instance, some analysts posit that previous stock highs are “resistance” areas that may be
difficult to break through and that previous lows are “support levels” because investors will
be inclined to buy when the stock dips. Id. at 124. Malkiel also suggests that technical analysis
could rely upon speculation that insiders will trade ahead of the release of information to the
market and that prices move incrementally in a direction as the information moves into wider
circles. Id. at 123.
45. Id. at 122 (noting that “all this takes place under the pennant of that great symbol
of sexuality: the bull”).
46. Pierre Schlag, Law and Phrenology, 110 HARV. L. REV. 877 (developing invidious
comparison between the academic discipline of law and the discredited practice of judging
human faculties by measuring skulls). Professor Schlag identifies in both cases a reliance on
“folk beliefs” and a studied avoidance of disconfirming evidence.
47. MALKIEL, supra note 3, at 118. R
48. Id. (“One of the original chartists, John Magee, operated from a small of-
fice . . . where even the windows were boarded up to prevent any outside influences from
distracting his analysis.”).
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However, the rebuttal to the belief in market patterns cuts through the
scientific pretensions and the jargon in intellectually devastating fashion:
Sometimes one gets positive price changes (rising prices) for several days
in a row; but sometimes when you are flipping a fair coin you also get a long
string of “heads” in a row, and you get sequences of positive (or negative)
price changes no more frequently than you can expect random sequences of
heads or tails in a row. What are often called “persistent patterns” in the stock
market occur no more frequently than the runs of luck in the fortunes of any
gambler playing a game of chance. This is what economists mean when they
say that stock prices behave like a random walk.49
Indeed, Burton Malkiel’s students produced charts identical to those re-
lied upon by technical analysts simply by recording the result of coin flips.
As a prank, Malkiel shared one such chart with a friend of his who was a
technical analyst. The chart “showed a beautiful upward breakout from an
inverted head and shoulders (a very bullish formation) . . . and the analyst
practically jumped out of his skin predicting that ‘the stock will be up 15
points next week.’”50
Empirical studies generally confirm the efficient market hypothesis
that current stock prices reflect all past information so that future changes
in price are independent of past prices. Technical analysis, in other words,
is a recipe for losing money, or, worse yet, paying someone else a commis-
sion to lose money on your behalf. Yet, even if technical analysis is a lousy
approach to investing, it has at least one saving grace: it reminds us that
investors sometimes do “act like a herd all running in the same direction,
which can produce pricing errors.”51 This kind of behavior can produce
“[l]arge speculative bubbles that appear out of nowhere and crash without
apparent reason.”52 In sum, although the practice of studying the charted
entrails of past markets may seem risible, the myth of Wall Street bulls and
bears is a useful reminder that “animal spirits”53 can steer the markets
away from more rational valuations.
B. Rational Market Mythology
  At first blush, the efficient capital markets hypothesis appears to offer an
anti-mythic view of the financial markets. First, it embraces randomness
and refuses to find spurious patterns simply to satisfy a human need to
produce order out of chaos; what will happen next does not follow predict-
ably from what went before. Second, because the market price is already
49. Id. at 141. The exception to this randomness is that “[t]here is a long-run uptrend
in most averages of stock prices in line with the long-run growth of earnings and dividends.”
Id. at 143. This is why long-term, buy-and-hold strategies have proved successful.
50. Id. at 143 (“He did not respond kindly to me when I told him the chart had been
produced by flipping a coin. Chartists have no sense of humor.”).
51. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 17, at 115. R
52. Id.
53. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST
AND MONEY (1936).
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correct based on existing information, a perfectly rational market has no
use for extraordinary individuals. (Building a low-cost, diversified portfo-
lio is not the stuff of which legends are made). Rational-market theories
were first developed by academics and were meant to replace Wall Street
folklore with a more studiously scientific approach.
However, the gap between the rational-market theory and folk beliefs
about financial markets may be more apparent than real. For initiates, as
Fox shows, the idea of the rational market sometimes arrived with the
force of revelation: “[a]fter about ten minutes it just hit me, this has got to
be true. The idea for me was so powerful; I said to myself, ‘This is order in
the universe’” (p. 105) (quoting Rex Sinquefield, MBA student at the Uni-
versity of Chicago, circa 1970, and former Catholic seminarian). Thus, al-
though it is a descriptive claim about how markets operate, the efficient
capital markets hypothesis may serve a mythic function to the extent that
its appeal stems not only from the strength of its empirical support, but
also from its normative cultural implications.
In particular, if market prices are always and automatically correct,
then government regulatory intervention in markets is an evil to be mini-
mized. For libertarians, including Alan Greenspan, the hypothesis would
seem to confirm deeply held views concerning the superiority of free
markets:
This was Greenspan’s ideology—and it had been widely shared in Wash-
ington and on Wall Street. Financial markets knew best. They moved capital
from those who had it to those who needed it. They spread risk. They gath-
ered and dispersed information. They regulated global economic affairs with a
swiftness and decisiveness that governments couldn’t match (xii).
Although the hypothesized rational market no longer assumes animal
form and cannot exhibit exuberance or depression,54 it exists nevertheless
as a reified entity separate from a society’s laws and institutions, ready to
punish those who would seek to fetter it with restrictive rules.
Further evidence that the efficient market hypothesis has caught on
because it legitimates certain cultural narratives is that, strictly speaking, it
appears to be a self-refuting proposition. The logical flaw in the hypothesis
was identified in 1980 by the economists Joseph Stiglitz and Sanford
Grossman in their article, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient
Markets.55 As John Cassidy summarizes:
[T]he efficient market hypothesis was based on a logical inconsistency. If
stock prices at every moment reflected all of the available information about
the economic outlook and other factors pertinent to individual companies, in-
vestors wouldn’t have any incentive to search out information and process it.
But if nobody finds and processes information, stock prices won’t reflect that
54. FOX, supra note 31, at xii (“Greenspan had once expressed the worry, in 1996, that
stock markets might be losing themselves in a frenzy of ‘irrational exuberance.’ When they
kept rising after that, he took the lesson that the market knew more than he did.”).
55. 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1980).
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information, and the market won’t be efficient. For the market to work at all,
there must be some level of inefficiency!56
Perhaps we can avoid the paradox by stipulating that “[f]ull-time profes-
sional investors capture enough of the value of new information to make
the game one worth playing.”57 However, if true, this significantly weak-
ens the semi-strong version of the hypothesis, because it takes away the
presumption that market prices must be correct.
Moreover, the hypothesis ignores the fact that human beings some-
times act irrationally en masse; for example, the hypothesis cannot account
for bubbles, and yet they occur again and again. Early pioneers of rational-
market theory had deliberately avoided extending the argument that mar-
ket prices move randomly “more than an ‘instant’ into its future” (p. 148).
That is because, “[o]ver any longer period . . . the tendency of men to
behave like ocean-jumping sheep stood in the way of rational theories of
market behavior” (p. 149).58 We dismiss crowd psychology at our peril.
Thus, even if high-tech stocks, real estate, or tulip bulbs are overpriced as
compared with some other class of investment that appears to provide an
equivalent risk-adjusted return, the imbalance can persist (even for years).
Making the “correct” investment too soon is just as deadly to one’s portfo-
lio as making the wrong investment.
Finally, a market’s internal equilibrium is no guarantee that the prices
assigned by the market will correspond with the true value of the stock.
(The analogy that comes to mind here is that it is always possible to tune a
56. CASSIDY, supra note 2, at 94; see also COX ET AL., supra note 10, at 105 (“Vital to R
the thesis that securities markets are efficient in the semi-strong form is the belief that sophis-
ticated investors and analysts will indeed examine public information to identify undervalued
and overvalued stocks. But if markets are indeed efficient in the semi-strong form, why
would they do this?”). However, if a recent interview with a Fidelity fund manager is evi-
dence, the efficient markets hypothesis has not diminished professional enthusiasm. See Fi-
delity Viewpoints, The Fidelity Contrafund Manager Sees Slow Growth and Hopes for
Surprises from China, FIDELITY.COM (Dec. 30, 2011), https://guidance.fidelity.com/view
points/danoff-2012?ccsource=email_monthly (“There are opportunities out there and we just
have to find them. Fundamental research never goes out of style.”).
57. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 17, at 114. R
58. The economist Merton Miller tried to solve this problem by pointing out that, logi-
cally, the market’s short-term randomness extends forward in time: “[I]t was always possible,
at any moment in time, to rearrange one’s holdings to reflect changed market circumstances.
This meant Bachelier’s ‘instant’ could be replicated again and again and again, into the indef-
inite future” FOX, supra note 31, at 149. Fox notes that while “certainly an elegant solution,”
the approach involved “unrealistic simplifications” Id. In some respects, Miller’s argument is
reminiscent of Zeno’s paradox, in which a tortoise and a hare run a race. Although the hare
moves faster than the tortoise and seems certain to overtake him, we can identify a point at
which the rabbit has halved the distance between them, then quartered it, then to the eighth,
the sixteenth, the thirty-second, and so on. The distance between the rabbit and the tortoise
can be divided and subdivided infinitely many times. Therefore, according to the paradox,
the rabbit can never actually catch the tortoise. But this is false for reasons that seem to apply
as well to Miller’s argument—even if our ability to describe spatial relations allows infinite
positions to be assigned, one object moving at a higher rate of speed will still pass a slower
object. For an overview of Zeno’s paradox, see JOSEPH MAZUR, ZENO’S PARADOX: UNRAV-
ELING THE ANCIENT MYSTERY BEHIND THE SCIENCE OF SPACE AND TIME (2007).
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guitar by putting the strings into harmony with each other, even if the
overall pitch of the instrument is sharp or flat). Thus, some scholars main-
tain that the underlying assumption that prices fluctuate around a secur-
ity’s true value “is not an empirically testable assertion and it can be
disregarded.”59 A test of market efficiency “might reveal whether stock
price movements made sense in relation to each other and the overall mar-
ket, but it was no help in showing whether the overall market was cor-
rectly priced or not” (p. 194). As the financial crisis of 2008 illustrates,
markets sometimes produce wildly incorrect valuations. At least in some
situations, “animal spirits” better explain behavior.
III. CONCLUSION
  Fox does not claim to resolve the controversy concerning the efficient
market hypothesis.  However, his narrative approach—which the back
cover of the paperback edition calls an “intellectual whodunit” as much
“as a cultural history”—seems to be in tension with the idea of a market
that is impervious to exceptional, individual talent. In Fox’s account, the
economists who developed the field of finance, often resisting collective
wisdom, saw further than other mortals into the workings of the universe.
Thus, a personalized, quasi-mythic framework is used to introduce a pro-
foundly impersonal view of market ordering.60
There is no logical contradiction here, but perhaps a mismatch of sensi-
bilities. The focus on individual economists may be a self-conscious (and
successful) effort to enliven otherwise dry material. Still, the packaging of
a story about perfectly efficient markets through a series of narratives
about extraordinary individuals tells us something about where Fox’s sen-
timents lie. However unprepossessing a lot they might be in their practice
of the dismal science, even economists can be mythologized.61
59. FOX, supra note 31, at 195 (quoting CLIVE GRANGER & OSKAR MORGENSTERN,
PREDICTABILITY OF STOCK PRICES (1970)).
60. A few of the chapter headings will convey the spirit of the enterprise: Gene Fama
Makes the Best Proposition in Economics; Jack Bogle Takes on the Performance Cult (And
Wins); Michael Jensen Gets Corporations to Obey the Market; Alan Greenspan Stops a Ran-
dom Plunge Down Wall Street; Gene Fama and Dick Thaler Knock Each Other Out.
61. See, e.g., FOX, supra note 31, at 94 (“Taking a class with [Milton] Friedman—a
charming, friendly, even-tempered little man saying outrageous things—was often a life-
changing event.”).
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